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George Henry Lewes (1817–1878): Embodied Cognition, Vitalism, and the Evolution of Symbolic Perception

Elfed Huw Price

Brain, Mind and Consciousness in the History of Neuroscience 2014 DOI: 10.1007/978-94-017-8774-1_7 (opens in new tab)

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AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Historical analysis Qualitative Peer reviewed
Topics Philosophy of mind
Keywords Social medium Eighteenth century Conscious experience Mechanical materialism
Key points Argues that George Henry Lewes' writings on the mind-body problem, particularly his rejection of cerebrocentrism, distinction between living and mechanical processes, and emphasis on ideation and culture, remain sophisticated and relevant.

Abstract

To date, George Henry Lewes’ contributions to the intellectual culture of Victorian Britain have been overshadowed by the literary success of his partner, Marian Evans (better known by her pen name, George Eliot). In this chapter I draw attention to both the sophistication and continued relevance of Lewes’ writings on the mind-body problem, and particularly his five volume Problems of Life and Mind . I focus on three key arguments made by Lewes that remain relevant today: firstly, his rejection of extreme cerebrocentrism in favour of a view of the mind as embodied , i.e. that the somatic substrate of mind extends to regions of the body beyond the brain; secondly, that there is a qualitative difference between the ‘incalculable’ mechanisms of living creatures, and those of machines; and, thirdly, that our capacity for Ideation (or symbolic thought) and our concomitant immersion in the ‘Social Medium’ (or culture) are defining and characteristic features of humankind.

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