Whistles, bells, and cogs in machines: Thomas Huxley and epiphenomenalism.
Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences 2010 DOI: 10.1002/jhbs.20441 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Historical analysis Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that Thomas Huxley did not hold metaphysical epiphenomenalism but a limited empirical epiphenomenalism about consciousness only, grounded in demonstrations of purposive, coordinated behavior without consciousness rather than in neurophysiological or mechanistic explanations. Contends that Huxley's label "conscious automata" was poorly chosen given his own account of mentality. |
Abstract
In this paper I try to shed some historical light upon the doctrine of epiphenomenalism, by focusing on the version of epiphenomenalism championed by Thomas Huxley, which is often treated as a classic statement of the doctrine. I argue that it is doubtful if Huxley held any form of metaphysical epiphenomenalism, and that he held a more limited form of empirical epiphenomenalism with respect to consciousness but not with respect to mentality per se. Contrary to what is conventionally supposed, Huxley's empirical epiphenomenalism with respect to consciousness was not simply based upon the demonstration of the neurophysiological basis of conscious mentality, or derived from the extension of mechanistic and reflexive principles of explanation to encompass all forms of animal and human behavior, but was based upon the demonstration of purposive and coordinated animal and human behavior in the absence of consciousness. Given Huxley's own treatment of mentality, his characterization of animals and humans as "conscious automata" was not well chosen.