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George Henry Lewes (1817–1878): Embodied Cognition, Vitalism, and the Evolution of Symbolic Perception

Elfed Huw Price

Brain, Mind and Consciousness in the History of Neuroscience January 1, 2014 DOI: 10.1007/978-94-017-8774-1_7 (opens in new tab) via Springer Nature

Summary

AI-generated from the abstract

George Henry Lewes' writings on the mind-body problem, especially in his five-volume Problems of Life and Mind, remain relevant today. The author argues that Lewes rejected extreme cerebrocentrism, instead viewing the mind as embodied, with its somatic substrate extending beyond the brain to the rest of the body. Lewes also contended that living creatures' mechanisms are qualitatively different from and 'incalculable' compared to machines. Finally, he proposed that humans' capacity for ideation (symbolic thought) and immersion in the 'Social Medium' (culture) are defining characteristics of humankind.

Study at a glance

Characteristics Historical analysis Qualitative Peer reviewed
Topics Philosophy of mind
Keywords Social medium Eighteenth century Conscious experience Mechanical materialism
Key finding Argues that George Henry Lewes' writings on the mind-body problem, particularly his rejection of cerebrocentrism, distinction between living and mechanical processes, and emphasis on ideation and culture, remain sophisticated and relevant.

Abstract

To date, George Henry Lewes’ contributions to the intellectual culture of Victorian Britain have been overshadowed by the literary success of his partner, Marian Evans (better known by her pen name, George Eliot). In this chapter I draw attention to both the sophistication and continued relevance of Lewes’ writings on the mind-body problem, and particularly his five volume Problems of Life and Mind . I focus on three key arguments made by Lewes that remain relevant today: firstly, his rejection of extreme cerebrocentrism in favour of a view of the mind as embodied , i.e. that the somatic substrate of mind extends to regions of the body beyond the brain; secondly, that there is a qualitative difference between the ‘incalculable’ mechanisms of living creatures, and those of machines; and, thirdly, that our capacity for Ideation (or symbolic thought) and our concomitant immersion in the ‘Social Medium’ (or culture) are defining and characteristic features of humankind.

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