The Role of Concepts in Perceptual Objectivity
Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology June 12, 2026 DOI: 10.1080/00071773.2026.2684317 (opens in new tab) via OpenAlex
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractThe paper examines whether applying concepts during perception helps us understand that what we perceive is objective—existing independently of our minds. It clarifies a specific version of this question and argues for an affirmative answer, a position called Conceptualism. The author then develops an objection to Conceptualism based on J.L. Mackie's work, offers an alternative Anti-Conceptualist account of perceptual objectivity, and explains where both the argument for Conceptualism and Mackie's response to it go wrong.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Keywords | Objectivity philosophy Perception Argument complex analysis Epistemology |
| Key finding | Argues that Conceptualism, the view that concepts applied in perception affect understanding of objectivity, is mistaken, and offers an Anti-Conceptualist alternative. |
Abstract
Does our application of concepts in perception have a role in our understanding of the objectivity of what we perceive? I clarify a specific version of this question and present an argument for an affirmative answer: Conceptualism. I develop an objection to the resulting position drawing on Mackie's discussion in “Perception, Mind-Independence, and Berkeley”, offer an alternative Anti-Conceptualist account of perceptual objectivity, and explain where I think the argument for Conceptualism, and also Mackie's reaction to it, go wrong.