Explanatory profiles of models of consciousness- towards a systematic classification
Camilo Miguel Signorelli, Joanna Szczotka, Robert Prentner
May 27, 2021 preprint DOI: 10.31234/osf.io/f5vdu (opens in new tab) via OpenAlex
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractCurrent models of consciousness are not universally accepted on theoretical or empirical grounds, and direct comparison is difficult because they differ in what counts as a satisfactory explanation, the tools they use, and the phenomena they aim to explain. A framework is presented for comparing models along three minimal dimensions: mode of explanation, mechanisms of explanation, and target of explanation. The empirical consequences of these discrepancies are discussed. The approach may help identify driving assumptions, theoretical commitments, and experimental predictions, and improve the design of future tests. The conclusion advocates for more integrative theoretical research, where axiomatic models may resolve current contradictions.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Epistemology Consciousness Focus optics Field mathematics Explanatory model |
| Citations | 13 |
| Key finding | Proposes a framework for comparing models of consciousness based on their explanatory profiles, focusing on mode, mechanisms, and target of explanation. |
Abstract
Models of consciousness aim to inspire new experimental protocols and aid interpretations of empirical evidence to reveal the structure of conscious experience. Nevertheless, no current model is univocally accepted on either theoretical or empirical grounds. Moreover, a straightforward comparison is difficult for conceptual reasons. In particular, we argue that different models explicitly or implicitly subscribe to different notions of what constitutes a satisfactory explanation, use different tools in their explanatory endeavours, and even aim to explain very different phenomena. We thus present a framework to compare existing models in the field with respect to what we call their "explanatory profiles". We focus on the following minimal dimensions: mode of explanation, mechanisms of explanation, and target of explanation. We also discuss the empirical consequences of the discussed discrepancies among models. This approach may eventually lead to identifying driving assumptions, theoretical commitments, experimental predictions, and a better design of future testing experiments. Finally, our conclusion points to more integrative theoretical research, where axiomatic models may play a critical role in solving current theoretical and experimental contradictions.