The Multi-Perspectival Monism of the Mind: A Neurodynamic Foundation for the Philosophy of Enactive Inference

Abstract

This manuscript provides a naturalistic foundation for a Philosophy of Enactive Inference and, on this basis, argues for a multi-perspectival monism. Starting from the thesis that the spatiotemporal dynamics of brain activity function as a "common currency" for neuronal and mental processes, the paper develops a multi-layered synthesis of the theories of Northoff, Buonomano, Friston, and Carhart-Harris. This model is crucially extended by integrating recent work on the affective and homeostatic regulation of predictive processing. It is demonstrated how the dynamic balance of two limbic memory systems (E/I balance) realizes the formal "precision weighting" of the predictive brain as lived affect (confidence vs. anxiety). Furthermore, the sleep cycle is identified as the homeostatic mechanism that recalibrates the brain's spatiotemporal architecture daily through the oscillation between sub- and super-critical states. The neurodynamic architecture thus described provides a concrete example of multi-perspectival monism: a single, psycho-physical process accessible from both the third-person perspective (E/I balance, criticality) and the first-person perspective (affect, consciousness), thereby forming the naturalistic basis for a non-reductive, processual ontology of the mind.