Grounding the Qualitative: A New Challenge for Panpsychism

The paper argues that the problem of consciousness is a specific instance of a broader problem: grounding the qualitative features of reality. It claims that a satisfactory solution should address this general problem, not just consciousness, and that panpsychism fails to provide such a solution. The author suggests that other forms of Russellian monism may avoid this difficulty, and that a neo-Aristotelian or ground-theoretical physicalism might be equally or more successful.

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Abstract

This paper presents a novel challenge for the panpsychist solution to the problem of consciousness. It advances three main claims. First, that the problem of consciousness is really an instance of a more general problem: that of grounding the qualitative. Second, that we should want a general solution to this problem. Third, that panpsychism cannot provide it. I also suggest two further things: (1) that alternative kinds of Russellian monism may avoid the problem in ways panpsychists cannot, and (2) that a kind of neo-Aristotelian or ground-theoretical physicalism fares just as well here if not better.