Vitalism and panpsychism in the philosophy of Anne Conway

Anne Conway (1631–1679) is usually called a vitalist, meaning she believed life is present everywhere in the world. This article argues that Conway held a stronger view: panpsychism, the idea that mental capacities are universal and fundamental in creation. Reading Conway as a panpsychist highlights her accounts of emanative causation and universal perfectibility. The author distinguishes Conway's vitalism from her panpsychism, noting that contemporaries like Ralph Cudworth and Henry More were vitalists but not panpsychists. Adding the term 'panpsychism' to the interpretive lexicon is important to avoid undervaluing Conway's originality.

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Abstract

ABSTRACT Anne Conway (1631–1679) is often described as a vitalist. Scholars typically take this to mean that Conway considers life to be ubiquitous throughout the world. While Conway is indeed a vitalist in this sense, I argue that she is also committed to a stronger view: namely, the panpsychist view that mental capacities are ubiquitous and fundamental in creation. Reading Conway as a panpsychist highlights several aspects of her philosophy that deserve further attention, especially her accounts of emanative causation and universal perfectibility. There are also historical benefits to interpreting Conway as a panpsychist. Through its history, ‘vitalism’ has often been used to describe philosophies that draw a sharp line between living and non-living nature; surely, Conway is not a vitalist in this way. Moreover, some of Conway’s contemporaries (for instance, Ralph Cudworth and Henry More) are sometimes regarded as vitalists, but were not panpsychists. It is important to distinguish between Conway’s vitalism and her version of panpsychism and to add a term like ‘panpsychism’ to the interpretive lexicon. Otherwise, we run the risk of undervaluing Conway’s originality within her own context and beyond.