Empirical Panpsychism: A New Synthesis
Journal of Consciousness Studies June 1, 2023 DOI: 10.53765/20512201.30.5.075 (opens in new tab) via Semantic Scholar
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractPanpsychism is often criticized as being unable to generate evidence or predictions, a problem rooted in its commitment to brute physicalism. Organismic panpsychism (OP) retains that commitment yet can be empirical in principle. The paper defends OP against objections concerning its metaphysics, its reliance on string theory, and its appeal to future science. It also discusses how OP avoids a troubling consequence of Russellian panpsychism.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Philosophy |
| Key finding | Argues that organismic panpsychism can be empirical in principle despite panpsychism's typical lack of empirical predictions. |
Abstract
It is frequently claimed that panpsychism is unable in principle to generate evidence or predictions. After exploring how this impasse owes to panpsychism's commitment to brute physicalism, I argue that organismic panpsychism (OP) can retain this commitment and yet be empirical in principle. I then explore ways in which OP can be defended against a range of objections. These objections primarily relate to OP's metaphysics, its dependency on string theory, and its appeal to future states of science. Finally, OP's ability to avert a worrying consequence of Russellian panpsychism is discussed.