Skip to content

Empirical Panpsychism: A New Synthesis

Ben Schermbrucker

Journal of Consciousness Studies June 1, 2023 DOI: 10.53765/20512201.30.5.075 (opens in new tab)

Study at a glance

AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Key points Argues that organismic panpsychism can be empirical in principle despite panpsychism's typical lack of empirical predictions.

Abstract

It is frequently claimed that panpsychism is unable in principle to generate evidence or predictions. After exploring how this impasse owes to panpsychism's commitment to brute physicalism, I argue that organismic panpsychism (OP) can retain this commitment and yet be empirical in principle. I then explore ways in which OP can be defended against a range of objections. These objections primarily relate to OP's metaphysics, its dependency on string theory, and its appeal to future states of science. Finally, OP's ability to avert a worrying consequence of Russellian panpsychism is discussed.