Idealist Panpsychism and Spacetime Structure

A philosophical argument shows that a specific form of panpsychism—idealist panpsychism, which holds that fundamental reality is purely experiential and that consciousness grounds physics and human consciousness—cannot account for the structure of spacetime. If idealist panpsychism were true, human consciousness and fundamental consciousness would share the same metrical structure. But human consciousness does not have the same metrical structure as spacetime, creating an explanatory gap that idealist panpsychism cannot close. Therefore, idealist panpsychism is false.

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Abstract

This paper presents a novel argument against one theoretically attractive form of panpsychism. I argue that ‘idealist panpsychism’ is false because it cannot account for spacetime's structure. Idealist panpsychists posit that fundamental reality is purely experiential. Moreover, they posit that consciousness at the fundamental level metaphysically grounds and explains both the facts of physics and the facts of human consciousness. I argue that if idealist panpsychism is true, human consciousness and consciousness at the fundamental level will have the same metrical structure. However, as I demonstrate, human consciousness does not exhibit the same metrical structure as spacetime. Consequently, the idealist panpsychist faces an explanatory gap between the fundamental consciousness she posits and spacetime. Idealist panpsychism is incompatible with the existence of such an explanatory gap. Thus, idealist panpsychists must either close this explanatory gap (which I argue they lack the resources to do), or idealist panpsychism is false.