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Formulation of Definitions of Consciousness on the Methodological Basis of Realism

Adas Diržys

Problemos April 27, 2022 DOI: 10.15388/problemos.101.4 (opens in new tab)

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Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Topics Philosophy of mind
Keywords Consciousness Methodology Ontology Realism
Key points Proposes that the question of mind should be treated from a metareflective realist stance, distinguishing representational from non-representational definitions of consciousness.

Abstract

In this paper, the traditional question – what is mind? – is suggested to be treated from the metareflective realist stance from which different determinations of consciousness could be apprehended as always instantiated and dependent on their definitions. Methodological differentiation between what is representational and what is non-representational is expressed as a divergence between particular definitions of consciousness and the ontological X, in this context, acting as a universality of consciousness. The derivation of this position is reached through the investigation of François Laruelle’s non-standard philosophy, Wilfrid Sellars’s critique of the myth of the given and Iain Hamilton Grant’s revisionary study of Schelling’s naturphilosophie.

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