COGNITIVE SCIENCE OF RELIGION AND FOLK THEISTIC BELIEF

Cognitive science of religion identifies cognitive mechanisms that generate religious beliefs. Some argue these mechanisms debunk folk theism. Common responses rely on distinctions between proximate/ultimate explanations and specific/general religious beliefs, but these have drawbacks and fail to preserve folk theism. Drawing on philosophy of mind and the problem of mental causation in nonreductive physicalism offers a way to preserve folk theism without rejecting the causal premise of the debunking argument or undermining cognitive science of religion.

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Abstract

Cognitive scientists of religion promise to lay bare the cognitive mechanisms that generate religious beliefs in human beings. Defenders of the debunking argument believe that the cognitive mechanisms studied in this field pose a threat to folk theism. A number of influential responses to the debunking argument rely on making two sets of distinctions: (1) proximate/ultimate explanations and (2) specific/general religious beliefs. I argue, however, that such responses have drawbacks and do not make room for folk theism. I suggest that a detour through the literature in the philosophy of mind regarding the problem of mental causation regarding nonreductive physicalism can provide a way for preserving folk theism without doing violence to the way cognitive science of religion is being practiced today. More specifically, I believe there is a way of responding to the debunking argument that does not require a rejection of the causal premise.