Experiential Event Dualism

A philosophical paper argues that the best form of dualism can account for how sense-organ stimulations cause brain events that cause conscious experiences, all understood as events. The first part lays out the commitments of this dualist view. The second part addresses two potential challenges—the unity of consciousness and pre-reflective self-consciousness—and shows how they can be explained consistently with the dualism. The resulting position yields fundamental clarifications in understanding consciousness.

Study at a glance

Abstract

Stimulations of our sense organs are events that cause brain events that cause our experiences, which are also events. The first part of this paper explains commitments required for the best form of dualism that keeps these facts clearly in view. The second part of this paper addresses two matters that may seem to threaten the viability of the view established in the first part: unity of consciousness and alleged pre‐reflective self‐consciousness. It is shown how to account for these matters in a way that is consistent with the dualism described in the first part of the paper. The resulting view supports fundamental clarifications in our understanding of consciousness.