Consciousness, determinism, and free will in nineteenth-century Portuguese medical thought: Resonances with contemporary neuroscience.
Ricardo Serrado
Journal of the history of the neurosciences 2026 DOI: 10.1080/0964704x.2026.2636457 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Historical analysis Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Bettencourt raposo Júlio de matos Miguel bombarda Consciousness Determinism Free will |
| Key points | Argues that Portuguese medical thinkers of the nineteenth century framed consciousness and free will within a naturalistic and deterministic framework, with Bombarda, Matos, and Raposo each offering distinct positions that rejected or limited genuine free will. |
Abstract
This article examines the nineteenth-century Portuguese medical-philosophical debate on consciousness and free will, at a time when advances in the biological and physiological sciences were undermining the notion of the soul as a regulating principle. The works of physicians Miguel Bombarda, Júlio de Matos, and Bettencourt Raposo are analyzed, showing how determinism, materialism, and positivism shaped conceptions of the relationship between brain, consciousness, and freedom. Bombarda defended a materialist conception of consciousness, arguing that free will is nothing more than the manifestation of neuronal activity that produces the feeling of freedom. Matos embraced determinism and rejected absolute freedom, yet intermittently allowed for behavioral modulation through education and effort, generating a partially compatibilist but unstable position. Raposo, for his part, advanced a naturalistic view of consciousness in which the brain itself constitutes will and desire, leaving no room for genuine freedom. In sum, this article examines the medical contribution to the nineteenth-century debate on consciousness and free will, a debate that unfolded in a distinctly naturalistic and deterministic framework.