Plea for a Processual Perspectivism: Toward a Philosophy of Enactive Inference
Preprints.org November 28, 2025 preprint DOI: 10.20944/preprints202511.2291.v1 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Keywords | Plea Consciousness Grasp Ontology Inference Autopoiesis Property philosophy Epistemology Cognitive science Interpretation philosophy Construct python library Intentionality Control management Hierarchy |
| Key points | Argues that consciousness is not a separate puzzle but the intrinsic, affectively regulated control structure of autopoietic processes, and that the Hard Problem is a symptom of flawed ontological assumptions. |
Abstract
This paper undertakes an ontological remapping of the philosophy of mind in light of the theory of enactive inference. We argue that David Chalmers' famous "Hard Problem" of consciousness is not an isolated puzzle awaiting resolution, but rather the symptom of a deeper, flawed premise: the stubborn persistence of a substance ontology and classical binary logic in our thinking. By drawing on the historical "Jacobi Dilemma," we demonstrate that any attempt to grasp consciousness as an isolated property inevitably leads into logical dead-ends. As an alternative, we develop a "Processual Perspectivism" (Leidig, 2025). By integrating current neurobiological findings on criticality (Tucker et al., 2025) and the thermodynamics of living systems (Non-Equilibrium Steady States, NESS), we demonstrate that consciousness is not an additional ingredient but must be understood as the intrinsic, affectively regulated control structure of autopoietic processes. It is not the puzzle, but the very solution to the problem of life itself.