Conservation Laws and the Philosophy of Mind: Opening the Black Box, Finding a Mirror.
J Brian Pitts
Philosophia 2020 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-019-00102-7 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Keywords | Cartesianism Conservation laws Dualism Gravitational energy Interactionism Noether’s theorems |
| Key points | Argues that Leibniz's objection to Cartesian mental causation based on conservation laws is question-begging, because conservation laws hold only where symmetries obtain, and assuming they hold in the brain assumes the falsehood of Cartesianism. |
Abstract
Since Leibniz's time, Cartesian mental causation has been criticized for violating the conservation of energy and momentum. (Non-epiphenomenalist property dualism is analogous.) Many dualist responses clearly fail. But conservation laws have important neglected features generally undermining the objection. Conservation is local, holding first not for the universe, but for everywhere separately. The energy (or momentum, etc.) in any volume changes only due to what flows through the boundaries (no teleportation). Constant total energy holds if the global summing-up of local conservation laws converges; it probably doesn't in reality. Energy (momentum) conservation holds if there is symmetry, the sameness of the laws over time (space). Thus, if there are time-places where symmetries fail due to nonphysical influence, conservation laws fail there and then, while holding elsewhere, such as refrigerators and stars. Noether's converse first theorem shows that conservation laws imply symmetries. Thus conservation trivially nearly entails the causal closure of the physical. But expecting conservation to hold in the brain (without looking) simply assumes the falsehood of Cartesianism. Hence Leibniz's objection begs the question. Empirical neuroscience is another matter. So is Einstein's General Relativity: far from providing a loophole, General Relativity makes mental causation harder.
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| Looking for the Self: Phenomenology, Neurophysiology and Philosophical Significance of Drug-induced Ego Dissolution | 2017 | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
Citations in the library
Cited by 4
- Comforting delusions? How to evaluate the plausibility of mystical-type insights in psychedelic experiences Philosophical Psychology August 14, 2024
- The Causal Efficacy of Consciousness. Entropy (Basel, Switzerland) July 28, 2020
- The Interaction Problem and Mental Causation: A Quantum Field Theoretical Perspective Qeios October 25, 2025
- The Constrained Disorder Principle May Account for Consciousness. Brain Sciences February 23, 2024