Conservation Laws and the Philosophy of Mind: Opening the Black Box, Finding a Mirror.

The long-standing objection that Cartesian mental causation violates conservation of energy and momentum is flawed because conservation laws have neglected features. Conservation is local, holding for each volume separately based on boundary flows, and global conservation requires convergent summing that likely fails in reality. Energy conservation depends on temporal symmetry of laws; if nonphysical influence breaks symmetry at certain times and places, conservation fails there while holding elsewhere. Noether's converse theorem shows conservation implies causal closure of the physical, so expecting conservation in the brain assumes Cartesianism false. Thus Leibniz's objection begs the question. General Relativity, far from offering a loophole, makes mental causation harder.

Study at a glance

Abstract

Since Leibniz's time, Cartesian mental causation has been criticized for violating the conservation of energy and momentum. (Non-epiphenomenalist property dualism is analogous.) Many dualist responses clearly fail. But conservation laws have important neglected features generally undermining the objection. Conservation is local, holding first not for the universe, but for everywhere separately. The energy (or momentum, etc.) in any volume changes only due to what flows through the boundaries (no teleportation). Constant total energy holds if the global summing-up of local conservation laws converges; it probably doesn't in reality. Energy (momentum) conservation holds if there is symmetry, the sameness of the laws over time (space). Thus, if there are time-places where symmetries fail due to nonphysical influence, conservation laws fail there and then, while holding elsewhere, such as refrigerators and stars. Noether's converse first theorem shows that conservation laws imply symmetries. Thus conservation trivially nearly entails the causal closure of the physical. But expecting conservation to hold in the brain (without looking) simply assumes the falsehood of Cartesianism. Hence Leibniz's objection begs the question. Empirical neuroscience is another matter. So is Einstein's General Relativity: far from providing a loophole, General Relativity makes mental causation harder.