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Panpsychism in Bergson and James

Joël Dolbeault

Bergsoniana January 1, 2022 DOI: 10.4000/bergsoniana.884 (opens in new tab)

Summary

AI-generated from the abstract

Bergson and James both defend a form of panpsychism, with Bergson likely influencing James. Bergson argues that matter possesses psychic characters, such as memory of the immediate past and motor memory, necessary to explain causation in the physical world, which he compares to automatic activity in living beings. However, he maintains a radical distinction between the inert and the living, where only the living is capable of creation. James, probably inspired by Bergson, similarly holds that causation in the physical world requires matter to have psychic characters. Unlike Bergson, James does not make a radical distinction between the inert and the living, leading him to connect matter and consciousness.

Study at a glance

Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Key finding Argues that Bergson and James both defend a form of panpsychism, with Bergson likely influencing James, but that James rejects Bergson's sharp distinction between inert matter and living beings.

Abstract

The aim of this article is to show that Bergson and James defend a form of panpsychism, and that on this point, Bergson probably had an influence on James. For Bergson, matter has psychic characters, in particular a memory of the immediate past and a motor memory. These characters are necessary to explain causation within the physical world, understood then as analogous to automatic activity in living beings. However, according to Bergson, there is a radical distinction between the inert and the living: only the living is capable of creation. Probably inspired by Bergson, James develops a similar idea: causation in the physical world is understandable only by admitting that matter has psychic characters. Nevertheless, unlike Bergson, James does not make a radical distinction between the inert and the living. This leads him to make a link between matter and consciousness.

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