Hard problems in the philosophy of mind
Alexandros Syrakos
Qeios March 1, 2023 preprint DOI: 10.32388/vwplua (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Key points | Argues that physicalism faces "hard problems" that are likely insurmountable logical inconsistencies between the experienced mind and physicalist tenets. The hardest, also affecting panpsychism, is that a person's particular first-person viewpoint exists nowhere else in the universe and cannot be explained by any combination of outside elements, leading the author to propose that a person is a simple substance. Other problems concern explaining conscious experience and meaning physically, with repercussions for free will and ethics. |
Abstract
The mind is our most intimate and familiar element of reality, yet also the most mysterious. Various schools of thought propose interpretations of the mind that are consistent with their worldview, all of which face some problems. Some of these problems can be characterised as "hard", not in the sense of being difficult to solve (most problems concerning the mind are difficult), but in the sense of being most likely insurmountable: they bring to the surface logical inconsistencies between the reality of the mind as we perceive it and the fundamental metaphysical tenets of that particular worldview, thus putting the latter in danger of being disproven. This essay focuses mainly on the hard problems that the author considers to be of greatest importance for physicalism, the currently prevalent worldview. Nevertheless, some of these hard problems pertain also to other views such as panpsychism. In the author's opinion, the hardest and most profound of these, pertaining equally to physicalism and to panpsychism, is the one discussed in Section 4: the particular subjective first-person viewpoint that defines a particular person can be found nowhere in the universe except in that person itself; all outside entities (physical or mental) are equally neutral towards the "particularity" of that person, which therefore cannot be explained as arising from any combination of such outside elements. Therefore, a person is a simple substance. Other hard problems discussed concern the physical explanation of conscious experiences and the physical explanation of meaning, while their repercussions with respect to free will and ethics are also examined. Although these latter hard problems have already been discussed elsewhere, a somewhat fresh perspective is given here by someone who is not a professional philosopher but a physical scientist.
Comparable studies
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| How do the brain's time and space mediate consciousness and its different dimensions? Temporo-spatial theory of consciousness (TTC). | 2017 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| The phenomenology of deep brain stimulation-induced changes in OCD: an enactive affordance-based model. | 2013 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| Looking for the Self: Phenomenology, Neurophysiology and Philosophical Significance of Drug-induced Ego Dissolution | 2017 | Theoretical or philosophical paper |