Aphantasia and the Mechanisms of Visual Mental Imagery.
Annual review of vision science May 6, 2026 DOI: 10.1146/annurev-vision-110425-105103 (opens in new tab) via PubMed
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractVisual mental imagery—the ability to see with the mind's eye—ranges from vivid visualization to aphantasia, a reported lack of imagery. Evidence from patients and brain scans challenges the old idea that imagery depends on the early visual cortex. Instead, imagery arises from interactions among high-level visual regions in the ventral temporal cortex, frontoparietal control networks, and a left-lateralized fusiform imagery node, which likely bridges visual and semantic information. A taxonomy distinguishing neurological, psychogenic, and congenital aphantasia clarifies the phenomenon's heterogeneity. Congenital aphantasia appears to reflect impaired access to visual representations rather than their absence. Recent findings support a revised neural model where conscious visualization emerges from dynamic network coordination, with implications for consciousness theories and clinical interventions.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Review Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key finding | Visual mental imagery arises from interactions among high-level visual regions in the ventral temporal cortex, frontoparietal control networks, and a left-lateralized fusiform imagery node, rather than from reactivation of the early visual cortex. |
Abstract
Visual mental imagery-the ability to generate percept-like experiences in the absence of external stimuli-varies widely across individuals, from vivid visualization to aphantasia, the reported absence of imagery. Evidence from neurological patients and functional neuroimaging converges to challenge the classical view that imagery depends on the reactivation of the early visual cortex. Instead, imagery emerges from interactions among high-level visual regions in the ventral temporal cortex, frontoparietal control networks, and a left-lateralized fusiform imagery node, which likely serves as a bridge between visual and semantic information. A taxonomy distinguishing neurological, psychogenic, and congenital aphantasia helps clarify the heterogeneity of this phenomenon. Congenital aphantasia appears to reflect impaired access to, rather than the absence of, visual representations. Altogether, recent findings support a revised neural model in which conscious visualization arises from dynamic network coordination rather than local reactivation, with implications for theories of consciousness and clinical interventions targeting imagery.