The Meaning of “Phenomenology”: Qualitative and Philosophical Phenomenological Research Methods
The Qualitative Report February 1, 2021 DOI: 10.46743/2160-3715/2021.4587 (opens in new tab) via Semantic Scholar
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractThe term 'phenomenology' should not be restricted to methods that strictly follow Husserl's philosophy. Many traits of contemporary qualitative phenomenological research, such as describing experience as 'what it's like' and aiming for presuppositionless description, actually arise from Husserl's own work. The legitimacy of calling a method phenomenological does not depend on adherence to earlier practitioners like Husserl. Instead, qualitative researchers should decide how much to engage with philosophical phenomenology based on what fits their subject matter. Methods can legitimately be called phenomenological even if they develop their own theoretical terms and traditions rather than importing them from philosophy.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Qualitative Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Philosophy |
| Key finding | Argues that qualitative research methods can legitimately be called phenomenological even when they develop their own theoretical terms and methods rather than importing them from Husserl's philosophical phenomenology. |
Abstract
I show some problems with recent discussions within qualitative research that centre around the “authenticity” of phenomenological research methods. I argue that attempts to restrict the scope of the term “phenomenology” via reference to the phenomenological philosophy of Husserl are misguided, because the meaning of the term “phenomenology” is only broadly restricted by etymology. My argument has two prongs: first, via a discussion of Husserl, I show that the canonical phenomenological tradition gives rise to many traits of contemporary qualitative phenomenological theory that are purportedly insufficiently genuine (such as characterisations of phenomenology as “what-its-likeness” and presuppositionless description). Second, I argue that it is not adherence to the theories and methods of prior practitioners such as Husserl that justifies the moniker “phenomenology” anyway. Thus, I show that the extent to which qualitative researchers ought to engage with the theory of philosophical phenomenology or adhere to a particular edict of Husserlian methodology ought to be determined by the fit between subject matter and methodology and conclude that qualitative research methods still qualify as phenomenological if they develop their own set of theoretical terms, traditions, and methods instead of importing them from philosophical phenomenology.