The history of qualia and C.I. Lewis’ role in it

The strict concept of qualia—focused solely on sensory states and credited to C.I. Lewis in current histories—actually originates with Johannes Müller in the mid-nineteenth century and was developed by structuralist psychologists who denied qualitative experience any causal role. Lewis himself rejected this strict notion, endorsing instead a pragmatic conception derived from William James in which evaluative states like painfulness play an essential, causal role in an organism's life. The paper argues that Lewis positioned himself against the strict conception, finding it phenomenologically false and philosophically misguided.

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Abstract

ABSTRACT In current histories, C.I. Lewis is credited for bringing the strict concept of qualia – concerned solely with sensory states – into contemporary philosophy. It is this strict notion which is then credited with bringing in worries about inverted spectra, philosophical zombies, and the idea that we can individuate the senses introspectively. In this paper, I argue that this is a mistaken reading of Lewis and the history of qualia. I argue that the strict notion of qualia stems from the work of Johannes Müller in the mid-nineteenth century and his work on individuating the senses. The structuralist psychologists who followed in his wake, in turn, developed an account where the qualitative character of experience played no causal role. I also show that Lewis adamantly rejects this strict concept of qualia. He instead endorses a pragmatic conception of qualia derived from William James in which evaluative states – such as the painfulness of pain – play an essential, causal role in the life of the organism. The upshot is that Lewis positions himself against the strict conception of qualia, arguing it is phenomenologically false and philosophically wrong-headed.