Can an Enactivist Approach Entail the Extended Conscious Mind?
Qiantong Wu
Phenomenology and Mind September 21, 2018 DOI: 10.13128/phe_mi-23624 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that the enactivist description of conscious experience at the personal level is still open to an internalist challenge at the sub-personal level, and proposes combining enactivism with predictive processing to resolve this. |
Abstract
This paper discusses the enactivist attempt to entail the hypothesis of extended conscious mind (ECM). The enactists suggest that conscious experience is a relational interaction between the subject and the external environment; this personal-level description of conscious experience naturally entails an extended sub-personal characterization of the material basis of conscious experience (i.e. the ECM). However, in this paper, I am going to argue that the enactivist description at the personal level is still open to an internalist challenge at the sub-personal level. In response to this challenge, I suggest combining enactivism with the concept of predictive processing, delineating a sub-personal characterization of conscious experience that corresponds to the enactivist interpretation at the personal level.