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Direct Realism and the Extended Mind

J. Christopher Maloney

Oxford Scholarship Online July 19, 2018 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190854751.003.0007 (opens in new tab)

Study at a glance

AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Key points Argues that the form, not the content, of a perceptual representation constitutes phenomenal character, and that direct realism is true because perception fuses representation and represented.

Abstract

Representationalism rightly treats perception as a type of cognitive representation. However, it wrongly proposes that perceptual content determines phenomenal character. Rather, it is the form, not the content, of a perceptual representation that constitutes phenomenal character. For direct realism is true: Perception is that form of cognition in which representation and represented are the same. Other forms of cognition recruit representations that are distinct from what they represent. In contrast, perceptual representation extends the mind's reach into the world by casting the very object perceived in the role of a self-referential demonstrative. By fusing representation and represented perception provides direct acquaintance with what is seen exactly as it is seen to be and thus determines phenomenal character.