Using category theory to assess the relationship between consciousness and integrated information theory.

Abstract

One of the most mysterious phenomena in science is the nature of conscious experience. Due to its subjective nature, a reductionist approach is having a hard time in addressing some fundamental questions about consciousness. These questions are squarely and quantitatively tackled by a recently developed theoretical framework, called integrated information theory (IIT) of consciousness. In particular, IIT proposes that a maximally irreducible conceptual structure (MICS) is identical to conscious experience. However, there has been no principled way to assess the claimed identity. Here, we propose to apply a mathematical formalism, category theory, to assess the proposed identity and suggest that it is important to consider if there exists a proper translation between the domain of conscious experience and that of the MICS. If such translation exists, we postulate that questions in one domain can be answered in the other domain; very difficult questions in the domain of consciousness can be resolved in the domain of mathematics. We claim that it is possible to empirically test if such a functor exists, by using a combination of neuroscientific and computational approaches. Our general, principled and empirical framework allows us to assess the relationship between the domain of consciousness and the domain of mathematical structures, including those suggested by IIT.