In search of lost time: Integrated information theory needs constraints from temporal phenomenology
Ishan Singhal, Ramya Mudumba, Narayanan Srinivasan
Philosophy and the Mind Sciences June 3, 2022 DOI: 10.33735/phimisci.2022.9438 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Key points | Argues that integrated information theory overlooks temporality and needs an axiom for time to account for temporal experiences of continuity, flow, and extent. |
Abstract
Integrated information theory (IIT) of consciousness proposes an identity between its causal structure and phenomenology. Through this assertion, IIT aims to explain consciousness by prioritizing first-person experience. However, despite its phenomenology-first stance, developments in IIT have overlooked temporality. As such, we argue that at present IIT’s phenomenological analysis is incomplete. In this critique, we show how IIT takes a non-identical illusionist stance towards the experiences of continuity, flow, and extent of our experiences. Moreover, in isolating temporal grains of experience to a single timescale, IIT misses out on capturing the multi-scale nested nature of temporal phenomena. Hence, we contend that IIT needs an axiom for time, through which its causal structure can be refined to account for temporal experiences. Here, we propose an axiom to address these concerns. We conclude by discussing how IIT may need to be revised if our concerns hold true.
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Citations in the library
Cited by 3
- Why does time feel the way it does? Toward a principled account of temporal experience. iScience October 17, 2025
- Category theory in consciousness science: going beyond the correlational project Synthese August 1, 2024
- Editorial: Insights in consciousness research 2021. Frontiers in Psychology April 20, 2023
Cites 27
- An information integration theory of consciousness BMC Neuroscience November 2, 2004
- Consciousness as Integrated Information: a Provisional Manifesto Biological Bulletin December 1, 2008
- How do the brain's time and space mediate consciousness and its different dimensions? Temporo-spatial theory of consciousness (TTC). Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews September 1, 2017
- Moments in Time Frontiers in Integrative Neuroscience 2011
- Minimal phenomenal experience Philosophy and the Mind Sciences March 24, 2020
and 22 more in the library