Biological constraints do not entail cognitive closure.
Michael Vlerick
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences December 1, 2014 DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsc.2014.07.008 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Assisted mind Cognitive closure Cognitive constraints Epistemic boundedness Epistemic scope Extended mind |
| Key points | Argues that cognitive closure does not follow from cognitive constraints, because arguments for it conflate representation with object of representation and the scope of the unassisted mind with that of the assisted mind. |
Abstract
From the premise that our biology imposes cognitive constraints on our epistemic activities, a series of prominent authors--most notably Fodor, Chomsky and McGinn--have argued that we are cognitively closed to certain aspects and properties of the world. Cognitive constraints, they argue, entail cognitive closure. I argue that this is not the case. More precisely, I detect two unwarranted conflations at the core of arguments deriving closure from constraints. The first is a conflation of what I will refer to as 'representation' and 'object of representation'. The second confuses the cognitive scope of the assisted mind for that of the unassisted mind. Cognitive closure, I conclude, cannot be established from pointing out the (uncontroversial) existence of cognitive constraints.