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Philosophy and neuroscience on consciousness - response to Felipe León and Dan Zahavi.

Acta Neurochirurgica November 10, 2023 DOI: 10.1007/s00701-023-05873-3 (opens in new tab)

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AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Commentary Peer reviewed
Key points Argues that philosophy and neuroscience are complementary rather than mutually exclusive approaches to consciousness, endorsing León and Zahavi's (2023) claim that any theory of consciousness must engage in philosophical enquiry and can only choose between good or bad philosophy. Also supports treating self-consciousness and selfhood as problems of consciousness in their own right alongside the mind–body problem.

Abstract

León and Zahavi (2023) have made a compelling case for the necessity of philosophy — and not only neuroscience — for investigating consciousness. In particular, they argue that any theory of consciousness cannot avoid philosophical enquiry and thus only can choose between good or bad philosophy. Also, the topics of self-consciousness and selfhood are highlighted as problems of consciousness sui generis next to the mind–body problem. I will try to elucidate a bit more the specific approaches to consciousness that philosophy and neuroscience take and thus elaborate why the philosophy and the neuroscience of consciousness are complimentary rather than mutually exclusive.

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