Skip to content

Powers and the hard problem of consciousness: conceivability, possibility and powers

Sophie R Allen

European Journal for Philosophy of Science June 1, 2022 DOI: 10.1007/s13194-022-00451-3 (opens in new tab)

Study at a glance

AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Topics Philosophy of mind
Key points Argues that conceivability arguments do not threaten physicalism when properties are understood as causal powers, unless an implausible form of emergence is true.

Abstract

AbstractDo conceivability arguments work against physicalism if properties are causal powers? By considering three different ways of understanding causal powers and the modality associated with them, I will argue that most, if not all, physicalist powers theorists should not be concerned about the conceivability argument because its conclusion that physicalism is false does not hold in their favoured ontology. I also defend specific powers theories against some recent objections to this strategy, arguing that the conception of properties as powerful blocks conceivability arguments unless a rather implausible form of emergence is true.

Comparable studies

Other theoretical and historical papers on philosophy of mind, most cited first.

Citations in the library

Explore topics