Judging Passage and Passing Judgment: From Distrusting the Present to an Error Dynamics Account of Passage of Time Judgments
Darius Parvizi-Wayne, Rasmus Pedersen, Jules Rankin
Review of Philosophy and Psychology June 17, 2026 DOI: 10.1007/s13164-026-00828-w (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Keywords | Time perception Prima facie Cognition Consistency knowledge bases Neurocognitive Philosophy of science Cognitive psychology Empirical research Function biology Empirical evidence Dynamics music Internal model |
| Key points | Proposes that passage of time judgments are grounded in error dynamics, where faster-than-expected prediction error minimization yields a sense of time moving quickly, and slower-than-expected yields a sense of time moving slowly. |
Abstract
Abstract Despite our proclivity to make either tacit or overt passage of time judgments in daily life, insufficient work has been done to uncover the neurocognitive mechanisms underpinning such determinations. A prima facie promising account of passage of time judgments derives from the predictive processing framework. More precisely, Hohwy et al. (2016) propose that the reported speed of the experienced passage of time is a function of how rapidly the perceptual system "distrusts the present" current perceptual hypothesis in favour of a new one. We will propose that this account suffers from an incapacity to explain the relevant empirical data related to passage of time judgments and also possesses its own internal shortcomings. In its place, we offer a predictive processing theory of passage of time judgments based on "error dynamics", according to which the sense of time moving quickly is grounded in the cognitive system’s subdoxastic detection that it is minimising prediction error at a faster rate than it expected. If, on the other hand, prediction error is being minimised at a slower rate than expected, time will be sensed to be moving slowly, and a more protracted PoTJ will be reported. We will demonstrate the internal consistency of this proposition, as well as its ability to account for the key empirical findings any model of passage of time judgments ought to explain.
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Citations in the library
Cites 7
- Awareness of the passage of time and self-consciousness: What do meditators report? PsyCh Journal March 1, 2019
- Forgetting ourselves in flow: an active inference account of flow states and how we experience ourselves within them Frontiers in Psychology June 3, 2024
- Special Issue: Experiencing Well-BeingPlayfulness and the meaningful life: an active inference perspective. Neuroscience of Consciousness 2023
- Can the predictive mind represent time? A critical evaluation of predictive processing attempts to address husserlian time-consciousness Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences September 1, 2025
- Flow and intuition: a systems neuroscience comparison Neuroscience of Consciousness January 4, 2025
and 2 more in the library