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The Science of Consciousness and Mystical Experience: An Argument for Radical Empiricism

Jason N. Blum

March 1, 2014 DOI: 10.1093/jaarel/lft073 (opens in new tab)

Study at a glance

AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Qualitative
Topics Mystical experience
Key points Argues that radical empiricism, which emphasizes emotion as fundamental and allows for nonlinguistic experience, provides a more accurate explanation for mystical experience than the dominant neo-Kantian model.

Abstract

Recent evidence in neuroscience and psychology militates against the dominant theory of consciousness that has typically been used in explaining mystical experience—a neo-Kantian model that emphasizes concepts and language as the necessary foundations of consciousness. Findings in neuroanatomy, psychology, and evolutionary biology indi-cate that emotion is more fundamental to consciousness than previously suspected, and that language does not play as foundational a role in human consciousness as has been widely believed. These developments suggest that radical empiricism—in acknowledging the possibility of nonlinguistic experience and in construing emotional/qualitative aspects of experience as nonreducible to discursive foundations—represents a more accurate understanding of the nature of human consciousness, and therefore offers a better explanation for the character of mystical experience. This perspective also has implications for the possibility of cross-cultural similarities in mystical experience and the question of the veridicality of mystical experience. SINCE THE LATE 1970S, the majority of scholars studying mystical experience have adopted a neo-Kantian epistemology which assumes that consciousness is fundamentally linguistic and conceptual in nature, and

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