Is Mystical Experience Everywhere the Same?
The Problem of Pure Consciousness March 29, 1990 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780195059809.003.0011 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Mystical experience |
| Key points | Argues that the assumption of a universal core to mystical experience is flawed and that mystical experiences are shaped by cultural and linguistic contexts. |
Abstract
Abstract The belief that mystical experience or that some especially important variety thereof is everywhere the same, regardless of the idiosyncracies of the individual mystic or of his or her cultural tradition, has been tacitly presupposed, dogmatically asserted, or explicitly argued for in much scholarly and popular literature on mysticism. All of this notwithstanding, Steven T. Katz, in a recent article entitled “Language, Epistemology, and Mysticism,”1 has attempted to show this belief false. This attempt came to the two of us as a direct challenge, for we had long assumed (rather uncritically it must be confessed) that the belief in question was true, even obviously so. In trying to respond to Katz’s challenge, we became more aware of a defect that inheres in most of the literature on mysticism, including Katz’s article.