How relational and "non-Western" is Bakhtin's theory of mind?

Abstract

This paper examines Mikhail Bakhtin's theory of mind, focusing on his relational and dialogical conception of subjectivity. The author discusses how Bakhtin has been embraced by the Western tradition of literary theory, particularly within the contexts of postmodernism and poststructuralism. He highlights the tension between Bakhtin as a theorist of discursive plurality and as a philosopher of ethical participation. The article addresses further Bakhtin's critique of modern Western culture, emphasizing the autonomy of technological systems and their detachment from cultural and ethical values. The author draws parallels between Bakhtin's early works and later critiques of instrumental rationality. Furthermore, the article compares Bakhtin's relational, dialogical concept of mind with non-Western models of consciousness, particularly Buddhist traditions. The author argues that while Bakhtin does not offer a positive ontology of the mind, his philosophy serves as a critical intervention in dominant Western models of thought. In conclusion, Bakhtin's theory of mind does not compete with Buddhism or cognitive science in providing a fully developed ontology of the embodied self. Instead, it functions as a critical reminder that consciousness is a participant, not an observer, and that the true test of thought lies in its capacity to engage with lived experience. This engagement is deeply ethical, as it calls for a responsible and participatory approach to understanding and interacting with the world.