Minimal Group Agency
Journal of Social Ontology May 8, 2025 DOI: 10.25365/jso-2025-8918 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Group agency Enactivism Normativity Intentionality Moral responsibility Organicism |
| Key points | Argues that a suitably modified version of List and Pettit's account of group agency could satisfy enactivist conditions for minimal agency, even if no existing account does so perfectly. |
Abstract
When considering the type of agency that supports group activity, social ontologists often think of full-fledged moral and intentional agency. However, many organism-agents found in the biological sphere fail not only to be morally responsible but also would seem incapable of the rational guidance characteristic of intentional agency. This raises the possibility that some groups may qualify as minimal agents without necessarily qualifying as moral or intentional agents. In this paper, I review conditions for minimal agency as set forth by enactivists and draw from existing social ontological work to explore the extent to which these conditions might be satisfied by existing accounts of group agency. Although no account of group agency perfectly aligns with the enactivist conditions, I conclude that a suitably modified version of List and Pettit's account could.