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Free will and animal suicide

Sabina Schrynemakers

Animal Sentience 2022 DOI: 10.51291/2377-7478.1693 (opens in new tab)

Study at a glance

AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Keywords Free will Commit Criticism Free state Libertarianism Epistemology Law
Citations 1
Key points Argues that the free will objection to animal suicide is mistaken, but Peña-Guzmán's criticism of libertarian free will is misplaced; the assumptions that free choices must be conscious or self-reflective, or that freedom cannot come in degrees, should be the targets instead.

Abstract

David Peña-Guzmán presents two arguments against the view that because only humans have free will only humans can commit suicide: (1) nonhuman animals may possess free will, and (2) the libertarian notion of free will is incompatible with scientific explanation. The free will objection to animal suicide is indeed mistaken, but Peña-Guzmán’s criticism of the libertarian notion of free will seems misplaced. His target should instead be the assumption that free choices must be made consciously or self-reflectively or the assumption that freedom cannot come in degrees.