Redefining disability and pathology as both developmental and relational: the ‘phenomenological congruence and flexibility’ approach to disability

Abstract

This paper reframes disability and pathology through a developmental-relational lens, introducing the phenomenological congruence framework to complement existing models. The ecological-enactive model, ecological functional model, and microactivist affordances approaches offer valuable insight into disability but do not fully account for how developmental trajectories shape people’s capacity to engage with environments over time. Phenomenological congruence is defined as sufficient and reliable agential-ecological coupling, understood as sufficient experiential intelligibility of the agent’s situation. Here, the agent experiences their situation as navigable, readable, and accessible, enabling meaningful engagements. Integrating insights from developmental psychology (including the importance of scaffolding social learning), critical disability theory, and Canguilhem’s view of health as ‘more than normal’, the framework identifies two dimensions: (1) the conditions that enable or impede phenomenological congruence, and (2) phenomenological flexibility: the agent’s capacity to negotiate and navigate various ecologies. On this view, pathology potentially arises when opportunities and abilities for phenomenological congruence are disrupted, and is treated as an evaluative benchmark for analysing situations involving disabled persons. Disability is reframed not as pathology, but as a marker that draws attention to specific needs and risks, inviting additional care, solidarity, and consideration for inclusion. This framework addresses blurred boundaries between disability, impairment, and pathology while highlighting the importance of social learning and support, adaptivity, and embracing unorthodox norms and ways of being.