The Cessation of Sensory Experience and Prajñāpāramitā Philosophy
International Journal of Buddhist Thought and Culture June 30, 2022 DOI: 10.16893/ijbtc.2022.06.32.1.111 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 3 |
| Key points | Argues that Prajñāpāramitā philosophy is best understood as describing a meditative state of contentless awareness rather than a paradoxical identity of truth and falsehood. |
Abstract
Received traditions of Prajñāpāramitā interpretation embrace a hermeneutic in which truth and falsehood are one and the same. This philosophy has deep roots in Indian Buddhism, and it gained prominence in Europe and her colonies through the writings of D. T. Suzuki and his devotee, Edward Conze. It is relatively easy to show that the “contradictions” that form the main axiom of their reading are the result of misunderstanding the texts they relied on. Having done this I discuss a new way of understanding Prajñāpāramitā which shifts the emphasis towards an epistemological reading along the lines of Sue Hamilton’s epistemic approach to Pāli texts. I show how Prajñāpāramitā makes sense in relation to a particular type of meditation practice that aimed to bring about the cessation of sensory experience leaving the meditator in a state of contentless awareness which early Buddhists called suññatāvihāra , “dwelling in [the] absence [of sensory experience] .”