The exceptionality of enactivism within 4E cognition
Henrique Mendes
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences February 13, 2026 DOI: 10.1007/s11097-025-10131-1 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Keywords | Enactivism Autopoiesis Neurophenomenology Embodied cognition Cognitivism psychology Mainstream Cognitive science Epistemology Cognitive robotics Philosophy of science Field mathematics Philosophy of language Situated cognition Constructivism international relations Cybernetics |
| Citations | 1 |
| Key points | Argues that only autopoietic enactivism, not other 4E approaches, fully rejects the foundational assumptions of traditional cognitive science. |
Abstract
Abstract This article critically examines the theoretical landscape of 4E cognition—embodied, embedded, extended, and enactive cognition—to assess whether it constitutes a true departure from the traditional framework in the cognitive sciences grounded in computationalism, representationalism, functionalism, internalism, and realism. While many proponents of 4E cognition claim to defend such a radical shift, I argue that only a specific strain of enactive cognition—autopoietic or autonomist enactivism—genuinely challenges all core tenets of mainstream cognitive science. Drawing on the causation-constitution dichotomy and the literature on weak versus strong variants of embodied and extended cognition, I show that most E-theories can be assimilated into the cognitivist framework when suitably qualified. By contrast, autopoietic enactivism, with its roots in second-order cybernetics and autopoietic theory, demands a deeper reconceptualization of cognition as emergent from dynamic, embodied interaction rather than internal symbol manipulation. It resists realist commitments to cognitive posits and leans toward radical constructivism, presenting a comprehensive reconceptualization of the field rather than mere theoretical elaboration. Thus, I conclude that the enactive approach remains the only strand within 4E cognition where a full rejection of the foundational assumptions of traditional cognitive science is possible.
Comparable studies
Other theoretical and historical papers on philosophy of mind, most cited first.
| Study | Year | Design | Participants |
|---|---|---|---|
| Psychosis as a state of aberrant salience: a framework linking biology, phenomenology, and pharmacology in schizophrenia. | 2003 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| From dopamine to salience to psychosis--linking biology, pharmacology and phenomenology of psychosis. | 2005 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| How do the brain's time and space mediate consciousness and its different dimensions? Temporo-spatial theory of consciousness (TTC). | 2017 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| The phenomenology of deep brain stimulation-induced changes in OCD: an enactive affordance-based model. | 2013 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| Looking for the Self: Phenomenology, Neurophysiology and Philosophical Significance of Drug-induced Ego Dissolution | 2017 | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
Citations in the library
Cites 11
- The Oxford Handbook of 4E Cognition Oxford University Press eBooks September 13, 2018
- Radicalizing Enactivism The MIT Press eBooks December 14, 2012
- Embodied and Enactive Approaches to Cognition Cambridge University Press eBooks October 31, 2023
- Extensive enactivism: why keep it all in? Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 2014
- Putting down the revolt: Enactivism as a philosophy of nature. Frontiers in Psychology October 21, 2022
and 6 more in the library