Direct Reference and Dancing Qualia
Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge 2007 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195171655.003.0010 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 10 |
| Key points | Argues that the thought experiments motivating a sense-reference distinction for ordinary proper names can be replicated for direct phenomenal concepts, revealing a tension in the semantic views of certain antiphysicalists. |
Abstract
AbstractThis chapter argues that there is a tension in the semantic views held by certain antiphysicalists. These philosophers accept Fregean arguments against direct-reference theories of ordinary proper names but maintain that phenomenal concepts refer directly. Against this semantic package, it is argued that the thought experiments that motivate a sense-reference distinction for ordinary proper names — roughly, Hesperus-Phosphorus stories — can be replicated at the level of direct phenomenal concepts. (A Hesperus-Phosphorus story is one in which one rationally believes both that object a has a property P and that object b lacks P, even though a = b.)