Conscious and nonconscious thought: Insights from the neuroscience of decision-making
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences May 26, 2026 DOI: 10.1073/pnas.2601239123 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Keywords | Qualia Narrative Perception Action physics Experiential learning Mechanism biology Consciousness Variety cybernetics Space punctuation Cognitive science Epistemology Cognitive psychology Intentionality Interpretation philosophy |
| Key points | Argues that conscious thought arises from a distinctive use of neural representations already engaged in nonconscious thought, rather than from a unique mechanism. |
Abstract
Conscious thought is often treated as a special class of neural processing, distinct from the nonconscious computations that guide most behavior. Here I offer a different perspective, grounded in the neuroscience of decision-making. I argue that conscious thought arises not from a unique mechanism but from a distinctive use of neural representations already engaged in nonconscious thought. Nonconscious thoughts are structured as interrogations that yield provisional intentions-decision-like commitments that guide action or inquiry without entering awareness. Using examples from perceptual decision-making and neurophysiology, I suggest that such thoughts depend on persistent neural representations that encode not only potential actions but the questions that give them meaning. These knowledge states may also preserve source-sensitive structure that supports a minimal experiential organization even when they remain nonconscious. Conscious thought, on this account, emerges when such a state is reformatted for potential report to another mind, or to oneself, recruiting theory of mind and narrative structure and placing its content in a space presumed to be shared. This proposal identifies a tractable bridge from nonconscious decision mechanisms to phenomenal consciousness, thereby placing part of the hard problem within empirical reach.