Rorty's Philosophy of Consciousness

Richard Rorty's endorsement of physicalism conflicted with his own philosophical aims, driven by a confused motivation that failed to separate physicalism from metaphysics and scientism. The essay examines the importance of metaphilosophy to Rorty's stance on consciousness, which is central to his project and derived from Ryle but uniquely metaphilosophical. It disputes Rorty's historical thesis about the concept of consciousness, discusses the social utility of first-person reflection on consciousness, and argues that Rorty's obsession with religion led him to embrace a scientistic agenda he should have opposed.

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Abstract

This essay begins by asking why Rorty would endorse a physicalist agenda which, on the face of it, ran counter to his aims in philosophy; and concludes both that his motivation was confused, and that he failed to detach physicalism from metaphysics and scienticism. I begin by showing the importance of metaphilosophy to Rorty’s position on consciousness, and the centrality of consciousness to his overall project. I then summarise Rorty’s position, which was essentially derived from Ryle, but uniquely driven by metaphilosophy. My assessment begins by disputing Rorty’s thesis about the historical origins of the concept of consciousness, before following him into his favourite argumentative territory by talking about the social utility of first-person reflection on consciousness, and his own motivations for wanting to undermine such reflection. I conclude that because of his obsession with religion, Rorty became entangled in a scientistic agenda he should have opposed.