The causal efficacy of consciousness: a neuroscientific analysis and explanation

Abstract

This study analyzes neural and behavioral events occurring before, during, and after the emergence of a pain quale and the consciousness of that pain to examine the causal efficacy of the quale and consciousness. It finds that events occurring before or concurrently with the emergence of the quale are neither caused nor influenced by the quale or consciousness. Events occurring afterward may also be unaffected by the quale or consciousness if they do not overtly involve phenomenal content. By contrast, activities that explicitly incorporate phenomenal characteristics-such as experiencing, remembering, or reporting the pain quale-are influenced by the occurrence and phenomenal character of the quale or consciousness. Accordingly, qualia and consciousness are not inert. However, their influence does not operate through mechanistic particle-force interactions. Instead, they function as higher-level factors that stand in stable, constitutive counterfactual relations to downstream neural and behavioral effects. Physically, they perform this role by providing the involved neural causal chain with their phenomenal information, which is necessary in initiating and structuring that causal chain and determining the content of the outputs. Nevertheless, qualia and consciousness cannot generate these outputs by themselves; the relevant neural circuits must be present to implement the mechanistic processing required for producing physical effects. Only when both components function together is the causal chain complete and can yield results. Thus, the study concludes that qualia and consciousness influence the neural system and, although they are not mechanistic, independent, or complete causes of physical events, they can be considered causally efficacious in a restricted, information-based sense.