Attention and self in Buddhist philosophy of mind
Ratio August 2, 2018 DOI: 10.1111/rati.12202 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Buddhism Philosophy of mind |
| Keywords | Epistemology Buddhist philosophy Action physics Perception Self Function biology Metaphysics |
| Citations | 2 |
| Key points | Argues that in Buddhaghosa's philosophy of mind, attention, not the self, explains cognition's grounding in perception and action by performing placing and focusing functions. |
Abstract
Abstract Buddhist philosophy of mind is fascinating because it denies that there is a self in one of the ways that has traditionally seemed best able to make sense of that idea: the idea that the self is the agent of actions including the thinking of thoughts. In the Buddhist philosophy of mind of the fifth century thinker Buddhaghosa what does the explanatory work is instead attention. Attention replaces self in the explanation of cognition’s grounding in perception and action; it does this because it performs two functions at once, a function of placing and a function of focussing. A comparison between the thought of Buddhaghosa and Brian O’Shaughnessy helps to clarify what is at stake in the residual employment of the concept self as a derived rather than a primitive notion.