Attention and self in Buddhist philosophy of mind

Buddhist philosophy of mind denies that the self is the agent of actions, including thinking. In the 5th-century thinker Buddhaghosa's account, attention replaces self in explaining how cognition is grounded in perception and action. Attention performs two simultaneous functions: placing and focusing. A comparison with Brian O'Shaughnessy's thought clarifies what is at stake when the concept of self is used as a derived rather than a primitive notion.

Study at a glance

Abstract

Abstract Buddhist philosophy of mind is fascinating because it denies that there is a self in one of the ways that has traditionally seemed best able to make sense of that idea: the idea that the self is the agent of actions including the thinking of thoughts. In the Buddhist philosophy of mind of the fifth century thinker Buddhaghosa what does the explanatory work is instead attention. Attention replaces self in the explanation of cognition’s grounding in perception and action; it does this because it performs two functions at once, a function of placing and a function of focussing. A comparison between the thought of Buddhaghosa and Brian O’Shaughnessy helps to clarify what is at stake in the residual employment of the concept self as a derived rather than a primitive notion.