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EXPERIÊNCIAS MÍSTICAS E A HIPÓTESE MCI

Veronica Campos, Daniel de Luca‐noronha

Sapere Aude December 29, 2025 DOI: 10.5752/p.2177-6342.2025v16n32p714-731 (opens in new tab)

Study at a glance

AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Topics Mysticism
Keywords Argument complex analysis Natural archaeology Cognition Mainstream Function biology Religious belief Epistemology Cognitive psychology
Citations 1
Key points Argues that the Minimal Counterintuitiveness Hypothesis neglects the role of emotions and feelings in explaining adherence to religious beliefs, particularly those prompted by mystical experiences.

Abstract

In this paper an argument is presented against one of the mainstream theories in the cognitive science of religion, the Minimal Counterintuitiveness Hypothesis (MCI). The MCI hypothesis explains the adherence of religious beliefs as a function of the degree of counterintuitiveness of the concepts figuring in the belief’s content. According to MCI, religious beliefs are adherent because they deploy concepts that are moderately counterintuitive, i.e., concepts that break a small number of our natural expectations about the world. We purport that this explanation is hypercognitivist: it neglects the role of non-cognitive states in the explanation of adherence. Though MCI might effectively explain the adherence of some religious beliefs, there are religious beliefs out there whose adherence seems to be much better accounted for by reference to emotions and feelings, which the MCI hypothesis is silent about. One such example, we submit, is that of beliefs prompted by mystical experiences, whose adherence don’t seem to be satisfactorily explained without reference to affective states present in the experience.

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