Naturalizing Phenomenal Intentionality
Andrea Pace Giannotta
Marking the Mark of the Mental 2025 DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-98439-6_5 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Qualitative Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Keywords | Phenomenal intentionality Consciousness Metaphysics of mind Naturalism Panqualityism |
| Key points | Argues that complementing Husserlian phenomenology with panqualityism can naturalize phenomenal intentionality while avoiding Cartesian skepticism and the problem of naturalism. |
Abstract
According to the phenomenal intentionality theory (PIT), intentionality is grounded in phenomenal consciousness : the qualitative and subjective character of experience, which makes possible the intentionality of mental states. PIT is in continuity with an approach in philosophy that originated with René Descartes and that is centered on the epistemological primacy of knowledge of one’s conscious mental states, i.e. primacy of experience. However, within this approach one first encounters the problem regarding the existence of the external world (Cartesian external world skepticism). Furthermore, one also encounters the problem of the relationship between mind and nature (problem of naturalism). I identify a parallelism between PIT and Husserlian phenomenology, which also developed the notion of phenomenal intentionality. Husserlian phenomenology faces the same problems as PIT: the problem of motivating Cartesian external world skepticism and the problem of naturalism. I propose a way out of these problems through a phenomenological investigation of the temporal nature of phenomenal intentionality. By complementing phenomenology with a version of neutral monism (panqualityism), I argue that it is possible to naturalize, in a specific sense, phenomenal intentionality.
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| Looking for the Self: Phenomenology, Neurophysiology and Philosophical Significance of Drug-induced Ego Dissolution | 2017 | Theoretical or philosophical paper |