Breakdowns of sensemaking: a neurophenomenological approach

Abstract

Abstract Sometimes our ability to make sense of the world breaks down. Such breakdowns of sensemaking give rise to a range of phenomena, including extreme experiences such as crisis and epiphany, as well as day-to-day forms of learning, frustration, or indifference. Various accounts in the domains of phenomenology and the neurocognitive and neurophysiological sciences capture facets of sensemaking and the phenomena that arise from its breakdown. However, the relation of these accounts and an overarching model of forms of breakdown has not been articulated. This paper offers such a neurophenomenology of breakdowns of sensemaking by emphasising various bridges between these perspectives. Concretely, it brings together phenomenological contributions in the post-Heideggerian tradition that articulate intersubjective, action-oriented and highly individualised dimensions of sensemaking, with neurocognitive and neurophysiological contributions that explicate enactivism in terms of predictive processing models and associated neural processes. The final model derived from these accounts describes breakdown phenomena in terms of a U-shaped distribution: extreme forms of breakdown that challenge fundamental dimensions of our sensemaking represent either crises or epiphanies. Breakdowns that do not immediately pertain to fundamental dimensions of our wellbeing give rise to a continuum of learning, indifference and frustration. A central role is played on this account by the notion of response, which determines whether a disruptive occurrence tends to either enrich or problematize our sensemaking practice.