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Consciousness in Early Buddhism and the Abhidharma Schools

Mark Siderits

Buddhist Physicalism? August 5, 2025 DOI: 10.1093/9780197799697.003.0004 (opens in new tab)

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AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Topics Buddhism
Key points Argues that a non-egological account of consciousness consistent with Buddhist metaphysics faces insurmountable difficulties, including the loneliness test, sorites problems, and explaining meta-cognition.

Abstract

Abstract This chapter discusses the place of consciousness in early Buddhism and Abhidharma. All schools of classical Indian Buddhism hold that consciousness is ultimately real, a claim a physicalist Buddhism would have to deny. The question is raised whether a non-egological account of consciousness can be formulated in a way that is consistent with the metaphysical scruples shaping the Buddhist philosophical project. A core difficulty is that no such account seems able to comply with the loneliness test imposed by the intrinsic-nature criterion for ultimate reals. But there are also sorites difficulties that run afoul of the requirement that the ultimately real be metaphysically determinate. The difficulty of accounting for the capacity for meta-cognition is also discussed.

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