Phenomenal consciousness, access to consciousness and the cognitive unconscious: the problem of correlativity

Abstract

This article analyzes the relationship and correlation between the cognitive unconscious, phe­nomenal consciousness, and access consciousness. N. Blok’s distinction between phenomenal consciousness (subjective experience, “what it’s like to be”) and access consciousness (infor­mation available for behavioral control and verbal reporting) is used as a theoretical frame­work. This approach is used to analyze the nature of the interaction between these phenomena and the area of ​​unconscious cognitive processes. The paper traces the conceptual origins, be­ginning with the ideas of Descartes and Leibniz, through the psychoanalytic tradition, andthe cognitive turn, as a result of which the unconscious was reconceptualized as the realm of the “cognitive unconscious” – a set of automatic information processing processes that influence behavior, emotions, and thinking without conscious awareness. The main goal of the article is an empirical and theoretical analysis of the relationship and distinction between three key components of human cognitive activity: the cognitive unconscious, phenomenal consciousness, and access consciousness. The problem with their correlation lies in the fact that, despite the intuitive connection in the holistic human mental experience, it is extremely difficult to draw clear conceptual and empirical boundaries. Experiments with subliminal per­ception, “inattentional blindness”, and “blindsight” demonstrate the difficulty of correlating neural information processing with the emergence of subjective experience (qualia) and em­phasize the key role of attention as a filter. The possibility of a “phenomenal unconscious” is considered an open question. In particular, a comparison of access consciousness and the cog­nitive unconscious reveals the problem of their delineation due to the dispositional nature of information accessibility. Differentiation criteria are proposed: controllability, the possibility of verbalization, and the nature of integration into cognitive operations. In conclusion, a model of hierarchical interaction is proposed, in which the cognitive unconscious performs the func­tions of primary processing and filtering, phenomenal consciousness generates subjective ex­perience, and access consciousness ensures rational control and reporting. It is concluded that further progress in understanding cognition is associated with the study of unconscious pro­cesses, which is also important for comparing natural and artificial intelligence.