moral panics and disproportionality: the case of LSD use in the sixties

Critics of the moral panic concept wrongly judge it by inapplicable standards, such as the disaster analogy. Using LSD use in the 1960s as an example, the author argues that introducing a new, potentially harmful drug does not create an immediate threat like a burning building, nor does a natural disaster involve a folk devil or deviant. However, the supposed threat of LSD did involve sensitization, stereotyping, exaggeration, rushed judgments, sensational anecdotes, and bogus claims. The moral panic notion remains valuable for illuminating social processes and should stay in sociology's conceptual toolkit.

Study at a glance

Abstract

Abstract Critics of the moral panic dismiss this extremely useful, often-cited, and durable concept on the basis of inapplicable criteria. Drawing on the example of LSD use in the sixties, these critics mistakenly assume that the disaster analogy is apt, insisting that the threat to society, and society's responses, be very much like victims trapped in a burning building. In addition to the fact that the introduction of a new and potentially harmful drug into a society does not entail an on-the-spot threat or reaction, the natural disaster does not typically involve a folk devil or deviant. But the supposed threat of LSD use did entail sensitization, stereotyping, exaggeration, the rush to judgment, sensational anecdotes, and bogus claims. The moral panic notion continues to illuminate social processes and deserves to remain in the sociologist's conceptual tool-box. A version of this article was delivered at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association in August 2007, New York City, at a panel, “Moral Panics–35 Years Later. ”I am grateful to Nachman Ben-Yehuda for helpful suggestions and moral support.