Max Scheler's philosophy of religion constitutes an essential phenomenology of religion centered on the concept of the "Religious Act," a form of givenness in which the divine or holy is presented. In this act, the person communicates with God in a unique and irreducible experience. The act is self-evident, but its self-evidence derives from phenomenological intuition rather than logic. Scheler describes three intrinsic features of the religious act, which the article reviews: intuitive understanding and the role of emotion, the act's characteristics, and an evaluation of Scheler's formulation. The article argues that the relationship between Scheler's religious act and the Divine is unclear, that speaking of "transcendence" implies an a priori "trans-world," and that Scheler's method conflicts with the task of phenomenology.
Ninian Smart's theory of religious experience occupies a middle ground between essentialism and maximal constructivism. While some philosophers label Smart a maximal constructivist, he actually proposes a two-poles theory distinguishing theistic and non-theistic contexts. Smart acknowledges that cultural-religious contexts, including religious beliefs, influence religious experience, but argues they do not fully determine it. This intermediate position can be called minimal constructivism.
Al-Gazali proposed four models of belief in God, each corresponding to a different class of people: prophetic, saintlike, theological, and vulgar. He argued that the prophetic model, grounded in mystical experience, provides the strongest foundation for theism. This model resembles contemporary evidential arguments based on religious experience. His theory can be reconstructed as a graded model, where prophets and saints achieve the highest grade of belief, while others occupy lower grades.